

Terrorism: Social Causes and Perspectives

Renato Matić, Anita Dremel, Mateja Šakić

Purpose:

The aim of this paper is to analyze the origin of different interpretations of the events connected with terrorism, with special emphasis put on different interpretations of causes and consequences of terrorism. The objective is to show that the same logic has perpetrated the causes of the problem and is being used to solve it.

Design/Methods/Approach:

This research into the social causes of terrorism leans against a critical theoretical perspective and uses a historical comparative method aimed at deconstructing some taken-for-granted perspectives regarding terrorism and its actors. It brings the understanding of the causes of terrorism into connection with the history of mutual relationships between today's main actors of global terrorism and anti-terrorism in the wish to explain the consequences of terrorism as resulting from the stable and continued relationship between the main actors.

Findings:

The analysis has shown that current approaches to dealing with the problem of terrorism are so strikingly unsuccessful because, among other reasons, they rely on the same logic that led to the problem in the first place and thus cannot be used to solve the problem. Current power relations between the actors of "terrorism" and "anti-terrorism" point to the need for a possible alternative approach to preventing the mutually complementing "terrorist" and "anti-terrorism" violence.

Originality/Value:

The greatest value of this analysis is that it offers a view of the problem of terrorism based in the tradition of sociological theory, particularly that of deviance, serving thus as an important complement to more customary criminalist, criminological, psychological and legal perspectives. Without such historically grounded and sociologically informed approach, critical perspective would not be possible.

UDC: 343.3

Keywords: terrorism, colonialism, center, periphery, the logic of power, power relations

Terorizem: družbeni vzroki in vidiki

Namen prispevka:

Namen prispevka je analizirati izvor različnih interpretacij dogodkov, povezanih s terorizmom, s posebnim poudarkom na različnih interpretacijah vzrokov in posledic terorizma. Cilj je pokazati, da je pri vzrokih problema in pri njegovem reševanju prisotna ista logika.

Metode:

Raziskava družbenih vzrokov terorizma se naslanja na kritične teoretične poglede in pri dekonstrukciji nekaterih samoumevnih pogledov o terorizmu in njegovih akterjih uporablja metodo zgodovinske primerjave. Razumevanje vzrokov terorizma povezuje z zgodovino vzajemnih odnosov med današnjimi prevladujočimi akterji globalnega terorizma in protiterorizma. Pri tem želi pojasniti posledice terorizma kot rezultat stabilnih in kontinuiranih odnosov med glavnimi akterji.

Ugotovitve:

Analiza je pokazala, da so trenutni pristopi pri obravnavanju problema terorizma izrazito neuspešni, med drugim tudi zato, ker se zanašajo na isto logiko, ki je privedla do problema na prvem mestu in je zato ni mogoče uporabiti za reševanje istega problema. Sedanje razmerje moči med akterji "terorizma" in "protiterorizma" kažejo na potrebo po morebitnih alternativnih pristopih pri preprečevanju medsebojno dopolnjujočega nasilja "terorizma" in "protiterorizma".

Omejitve/uporabnost raziskave:

Največja vrednost analize je predstavitev tistega pogleda na problem terorizma, ki temelji na tradiciji sociološke teorije, zlasti teorij o deviantnosti. Tako predstavlja pomembno dopolnilo k bolj razširjenim kriminalističnim, kriminološkim, psihološkim in pravnim vidikom. Brez takšnega zgodovinsko utemeljenega in sociološko podkrepjenega pristopa kritični pogledi niso možni.

UDK: 343.3

Ključne besede: terorizem, kolonializem, center, periferija, logika moči, razmerja moči

1 INTRODUCTION

When you enter "terrorism" in the search engine of one of the world's largest scholarly multidiscipline databases, *Academic Search Complete*, it lists 91,839 hits¹ from various levels and fields, 90% of which have been written since September 2001. How can we interpret this disproportion regarding academic interest if we take into account that terrorist attacks prior to the collapse of WTC towers had not been an irrelevant or negligible occurrence compared to the period posterior to that event?

¹ In September 2014.

This paper tries to argue that the political interpretation of the significance of a certain occurrence and its causes and consequences, terrorism in this case, imposed or artificially enforced the interest of scientists in it, making the obscure academic field, in Richardson's words (2006: 1), come to the limelight. Herschinger (2014: 46) also uses this as a starting point to stress that "(...) today, analyses of terrorism – in particular of transnational or international terrorism – are at an all-time high in Political Science and International Relations". This becomes particularly prominent when content analysis of articles on terrorism (cf. Ali & Gruenewald, 2006; Erez, Weimann, & Weisburd, 2011; Reid et al., 2005;) reveals that political discourse prevails over continuous scientific and critical empirical testing in representations of terrorism, trying to explain the reality in a "top-down" manner, i.e., dealing with a phenomenon as functional or dysfunctional in relation to a frozen picture of reality in which mutual relationships of actors are morally unquestionable.² What can also frequently be noticed is the attachment of a certain value to an observed phenomenon, precisely concerning its political (un)acceptability. The victims, who are almost without exception civilians not involved in previous relationships between the main actors,³ thereby serve to intensify the argument on the political assessment and not as the originating point and the purpose of political activity.

In order to avoid the ideological and biased interpretation of observed reality and to simultaneously stay in the scientifically grounded discourse, it is necessary to include the analysis of the up-to-date mutual relationships between the main actors of global "terrorism" and "anti-terrorism" into the understanding of the causes of present-day terrorism. The notion of actor thereby encompasses in the widest sense the protagonists of economic, cultural, and political strategies and actions that marked and directed the relationships between the societies from which today's participants in terrorist and anti-terrorism activities come. We will therefore pursue to provide an explanation of the consequences arising as the end result of these relationships, or in other words of long-term and value-stabilized interaction between the main actors. The next step includes the questioning of globally accepted and actually imposed models of opposing terrorism, with a special emphasis on their origin, i.e., that same logic and way of thinking that have produced the threat and promoted it to the frightening extent it has today. The analysis of current power relations of protagonists and direct participants in "terrorist" and "anti-terrorism" activities aims to answer the question about the possible results that can be expected of the globally accepted "antiterrorism" model, which at the same time brings to the fore the question of authenticity of the political representation of the real intention of the "global war on terrorism" (cf. Baker-Beall, 2009, 2014; Lange & Dawson, 2009). Finally, bearing in mind the need to provide a possible alternative approach in addition to the critique, we consider

2 *On sociological and other theoretical approaches to this problem, and potential weaknesses of some, see for instance Park (1941), Markides and Cohn (1982), Worrell (2011), Burton (1978), Ross (1999), and Boggs (2011).*

3 *Civilian, non-combat victims are shown in many definitions of terrorism to be a crucial moment (cf. Thalif, 2005: 11). If only professional military victims were involved, terrorism would eschew the definition. The idea of purposeful spreading of fear is here very relevant (cf. Rapoport, 1984).*

still unused resources and models of preventing this so far symbiotic series of “terrorist” and “anti-terrorism” activities.

2 CAUSES OF TERRORISM

Scientific critique and academic autonomy are compromised if a social phenomenon, as destructive in its effects as terrorism, is under the pressure of non-scientific interests not observed in the context of similar phenomena that have as destructive effects as terrorism but are called other names or are not treated as equally destructive.⁴ These phenomena result from the social relations founded upon the root difference in power distribution, whereby one social actor (an individual or a group) seizes the status of the “stronger” one based on the greater amount of initial or subsequently gained power and thus succeeds in imposing his or her will to the “weaker” one against his or her consent (Weber, 1999), and acquires consequently from that kind of relationship a relatively permanent gain or realizes an intended interest. The relationship between the rich and the poor is developed out of or parallel to this relationship between the stronger and the weaker, whereby greater power and wealth are accumulated on the same side. These initial relationships further lead to the development of the relationship between the slaveholder and the slave, the colonizer and the colonized, the exploiter and the exploited, the developed and the undeveloped – and they all need to be dialectically taken into consideration when the dynamics between the center and the periphery (cf. Wallerstein, 1980, 1988, 2006) is considered.

The colonizer-colonized and center-periphery relationships are, among the mentioned ones, particularly important in the modern society:⁵ they build rational activity directed to permanent multiplication of wealth and power into the most purposeful conception of desirability or a social value (cf. Nyatepe-Coo, 2004), without considering possible consequences in terms of human lives or cultural and natural assets along the way (cf. Habermas on the types of rationalization, 1988, 2002).

The concept of colonialism implies the division of the world on the basis of power defined as the will imposed in a certain social relationship by the stronger actor over the weaker with or without his or her consent, with the goal of realizing a certain pragmatic interest (cf. Onwudiwe, 2001). This definition also includes numerous social relationships historically appearing even before the end of the

4 *Economic, political and cultural dimension are thereby important to legitimize some forms of activities which have many victims but are treated as not nearly as problematic. Some pharmacological testing or the practice of artificially provoking armed conflicts for the purposes of spreading weapon sales market are among the examples that prove that it is not the perspective of victim that is really taken as the starting and final point of the fight against terrorism. The comparison of the number of victims in Iraq during US war on terror and during Saddam Hussein's time is useful here as well. The war that promotes democracy and human rights protection is treated differently from terrorism regardless of the number of victims (cf. Gordon, 2014). It is, therefore, very hard to talk of a possibility to “surgically” remove terrorism from the civilization that has participated in its production.*

5 *Without entering the debate on terminology and periodization, and avoiding the approach that looks for specific historical moments or processes, “modern” is here treated from the perspective of the consequences of the Enlightenment concerning dramatic changes to European societies and social institutions.*

15th century, but the discovery of the New World is conventionally taken as the dividing line (Braudel, 1973), which means that from 1492 to 1529 first colonial forces included Spain due to its occupation of the parts of the New World and the Pacific, and Portugal with its colonies in Africa, Asia, and a part of the Far East. Alongside Spain and Portugal, other countries on the list of global economic exploiters are the UK, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, and the USA after its late 18th century independence. Finally, but not less tragically, from the late 19th century to the mid-20th century, the countries that became or aspired to become colonial forces include Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia with its possessions in Caucasus and a big part of Asia. Facing the First World War, 66.8% of the planet, with over 60% population, is occupied by England, Russia, France and Germany. The so called economic objectives, which actually aim at the exploitation of the resources and market of cheap or often even slave workforce, demographic objectives of migration of excess population to the colonies, and geopolitical objectives, including the control of the sea, road, strategic areas and strongholds, get to be realized with the help of continuous centuries-long genocide,⁶ culturocide and ecocide.

Such long-term temporally and socially stabilized social relationships, which can be valued as unjust and exploitative, work to institutionalize a permanent relationship between the social roles of the stronger violent one, on the one hand, and the weaker victimized one, on the other. After that, regardless of the individual will of the members of concerning societies, the socialization process leads to the internalization of the norms and values that define such opposing roles in advance.⁷ Despite the processes of decolonization after WW II, which have introduced certain changes in the social space of culture (though these changes need to be approached extremely carefully considering increasingly aggressive content and form of mediating the mass culture), politics, and economy, the power relations, and game rules have remained equally unjust. What is more, they have served as the model and basis for even more sophisticated forms of exploitation, which are in social sciences understood and explained with the help of a somewhat more contemporary category of “network”, which presumes the existence and concentration of extraordinary power, but in a different way (Katunarić, 2000), dissimilar from traditional forms of hierarchy or the center-periphery relationship. This power is concentrated in financial centers, in which the decisions that change the destinies of all who are in any way financially dependent or controlled are made. Life quality and life itself are thereby pushed to the margins of the final consequences of the decisions made in the center.

This is where the level of causality is reached, which is understood and accepted extremely slowly in decision-making centers with global consequences – global strategic decisions. The results of the decisions, regardless of the decision-making level, are felt even after the first series of direct consequences had become finished past, and intensify multiply and unpredictably, especially if initial decisions are not thought over in the light of all possible predictable consequences.

⁶ *In the sense that the consequence is the death of peoples, not necessarily the intent or motivation.*

⁷ *This process enables the birth of new forms of power and social control, less visible and less repressive but more efficient than ever (cf. Foucault, 1994).*

The paper, therefore, proceeds to develop the thesis on the consequences of decisions led by the same *logic of power*, i.e., by the absolute reliance on the inexhaustible capacities of wealth and power, along persistent yearlong refusal to accept responsibility for unwanted consequences.

3 CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM

Power and wealth are often uncritically accepted as exclusive resources that ensure the ability to manage the quality of one's life and to participate in the making of decisions about one's own destiny. The lack of these resources can thus produce several potential reactions. It is here that it is possible to apply the structural strain theory (Merton, 1968) which can, in addition to its original orientation to the American society, be used as a wider and even global framework, especially if the thesis is accepted that the development of a part of humankind, based on the unstoppable concentration of wealth and power, found its model in the acceptance of the American dream. The reactions of conformism, innovation, ritualism, retreat and rebellion in this context are, therefore, discussed below.

Conformism to the same success logic, or the goals and resources of the decision-making centers, is mostly only theoretical and practically available only to an extremely small number of individuals selected according to certain criteria from the periphery or the network margins.

Opposite to this, innovation potential created by this global power distribution is very much present in the form of organized crime which started spreading globally much before other forms of joint organized action. The flexibility of crime, its resistance to various ideological viruses and its possibility to neutralize and/or instrumentalize every, especially institutionalized, form of crime prevention or resistance, can be matched to the ability of capitalism to use and turn to its benefit everything that happens to be in its way.

Numerous local protagonists of war, masters of life and death, serve as role models that many would follow if they were given the smallest chance, because the only alternative they have is to work as slaves, if they are lucky, in marginal subsidiaries of global corporations for only couple of cents a day, which reminds of Merton's image of an adapted ritualist (Merton, 1968).⁸

The next possible reaction includes the biggest population and it can, with even greater amount of resignation, be called retreat (Merton, 1968), which can, in the center, in addition to rummaging through the garbage, be a matter of free choice and sometimes even create intense forms of mutual solidarity. However, this type of retreat is completely coercive, imposed and final, because in the long run it offers nothing but hunger, sickness, and death. All so far mentioned possibilities exclude the sense of purpose of one's life and actions, which are very much important but hard to find in the context of standard success, organized crime or some of the countless armed groups or militias, and impossible to find in inhuman conditions of economic production, or dying of AIDS or hunger.

⁸ For some other versions of strain theory see for example Cloward and Ohlin (1960), Hirschi (1969), Agnew (1992), and Featherstone and Deflem (2003).

The fifth reaction is, therefore, the consequence of all mentioned types of relationships between the weaker and the stronger, the rich and the poor, the colonizers and the colonized, the included and the excluded, and is frighteningly unstoppable and globally threatening: rebellion (Merton, 1968). It cannot be easily stopped by a police intervention, by a local intervention of the national guard, or a classical military intervention in a war in any part of the planet. The last thirteen years of practice have proven this – much has been invested in terms of money and human lives, but the threat has not been reduced (Pentagon admits this too).⁹ The fifth reaction in its purest form reveals total absurdity of counting on unlimited material resources of economic, political and military power structures, which can ensure advantage over the real or fictional enemy for a long time but cannot offer the basis for making a personal decision to self-destruct oneself and to consecrate one's life by earning it the ultimate purpose in a handy individual or multiple murder.

Such an individual act is the final consequence of all before-mentioned types of relationships and strategic decisions that preceded it and produced a critical mass of external circumstances, which oriented individual socialization towards the internalization of norms and values directed at deadly suicidal attacks.¹⁰ Such an act is legally a crime, subject to sanctions that were never before foreseen or applied to a long-term series of described decisions and actions. All activities so far performed or being initiated today in the name of civilizational progress, economic development or democracy, regardless of the number of innocent victims they have left behind, have never been subject to any law that would forbid, persecute or sanction them. This is so because the notions of civilizational progress, economic development and democracy are unquestioned values in the name of which the victims of colonial occupation were at one time called "uncivilized savages", and the victims of contemporary nuclear, chemical or biomedical experiments on new types of weapons merely "collateral victims".

Terrorism in the context of the reactions is sided with genocide, culturocide and ecocide that preceded and conditioned it and served as the legitimation basis for rationalizing its ways. The idea of fulfilling a life goal in a suicidal action, which is the result of the ideological instrumentalization of Islam (cf. Ranstorp, 1996), and the justification of such an act in the face of mentioned injustice, exploitation and crime, contribute to a relatively unproblematic status of ritual suicide and murder as heroic acts (cf. Rapoport & Alexander, 1982). This is particularly so if observed in relation to strategic planning of warfare from the safest places in the world, from which thousands or millions of victims are defined as a civilizational good or a collateral damage, and in relation to commands to do crime without personal risk or in relation to directly committed crime whereby only personal safety is taken into account.

Besides, provided the causes that led to it still exist, terrorism will still be, among the mentioned types of reactions and possibilities, an appealing and

⁹ *Far less money would be needed to deal with the problems of hunger and illiteracy in the world than it is being used for fighting with these consequences of hunger and illiteracy.*

¹⁰ *Religious and political indoctrination can suffice alone, as in the case of volunteers from the West, but white colonial Europe has played the crucial role in the sense of the beginning of this matter.*

acceptable choice for many of the “excluded” actors living in the periphery whose alternative is a miserable and inhuman living or dying of AIDS or hunger. A personal choice of suicide or murder of anyone considered as enemy (all those who in any way symbolize or present “the civilization of evil”) (cf. Hacker, 1996; Klein, 2014; Stitt, 2003), including the most radical version of seeing as a life purpose the pulling with yourself into death all those who do not believe or think the same, will be represented by ideologists as the path to freedom, far from the distant center where the decisions directing numerous destinies far on the periphery are made.

Not only professional interest but also a normal human concern seek answers and consider the possibilities of exiting this vicious circle. Still, every scientific reflection must doubt the sincerity of most included actors when it comes to their determination to stop the terrorist threat.

4 CAUSE UNCERTAINTY AND THE LOGIC OF POWER

The question about the possibility to find exit or an efficient solution that would satisfy all included actors as well as all others who more or less against their will get involved as the space of neutrality is evidently and quickly disappearing, demands the analysis of up-to-date practical attempts of dealing with the problem. The first view of globally accepted (and in fact imposed) models of fighting terrorism puts accent on the persistent and consistent avoidance to deal with the causes of terrorism. Why is it that the causes of the problem are not talked about when this is the only proven and generally accepted way to create an efficient strategy for tackling any issue?

To a large extent because the main decision makers in the so-called fight against terrorism are precisely the actors who unreservedly want to preserve all the stabilized global social relationships and circumstances that are *conditio sine qua non* of terrorism. Thus, the conclusion is imposed that terrorism is opposed using the same way of thinking that provided the basis for the decisions that produced the threat in the first place and has advanced it to today’s frightening extent. The second conclusion, seen as utterly subversive by the carriers of the official anti-terrorism politics, and actually only a logical consequence of everything done so far, is that antiterrorism is only another master narrative or a story and the terrorist threat a great instrument of realizing special political and economic interests of some groups. The direction of moral panic (cf. Furedi, 2005) towards the mood that allows the targeting of enormous economic resources, unthinkable enormous in the normal circumstances, towards the needs of internal security and war on those parts of the planet that are multiply economically and politically interesting. The easiest to realize among the political benefits is the keeping of the dominant position in internal affairs, using a simple pre-election rhetoric that at the same time points to visible threats and to itself as the only option guaranteeing an efficient solution to the threats, a higher safety level, and the salvation of democracy and the future of the generally desirable way of living.

Political and military strategies aimed at stopping the terrorist threat are based on the same principles that in the 20th century divided the so called interest

areas, used to maintain the so called balance of fear at times of the big East-West bloc division (Cohen & Mihalka, 2002). The approach to the problem of terrorism during the Cold War should also not be forgotten: each side saw its actors as the fighters for freedom, and the actors of the other side as terrorists, depending on who they opposed, and received accordingly the logistic support, weapons and combat training. It is well-known that today's notorious terrorists and "enemies" of global democracy and security, primarily the enemies of the national security of the countries leading the "anti-terrorism coalition", have for years and decades been considered the biggest supporters of intelligence and political elites of these countries.¹¹

The origin of political decisions and different strategies created in one center but with consequences concentrically spreading to the global level lies in the logic of modern society. Modernization namely implies technical rationality that created the preconditions for the previously described institutional injustice and it still plays a dominant role when it comes to economic and political interests. The application of technical rationality to all areas of social life turned out to be in many cases an efficient means of standardizing a desirable life quality. The rise in the quality of life, on the one side, has as a rule caused the drop or degradation in the living standard on some other side, meaning that technical rationality has never stopped serving as the instrument of domination and irresponsible governance over people and nature in general (cf. Edkins, 2008 on biopolitics and governance; Pain, 2014). Marcuse (1987) sees the exercise of control as the essence of instrumental rational action, and rationality and exploitation as the key factors of power in not only industrially developed societies but also in all areas of making decisions that bring economic, political or cultural benefits.

But, can the same way of thinking that caused the problem be used to solve it? The *logic of power* that was dominant in the time when presuppositions for actual and so far insoluble global problems were formed and that directly led to terrorism as the central problem discussed here, can hardly be imagined to offer an original way out. What does the current selected model of action look like and can it neutralize terrorism as a global threat? The central question should actually be whether the same logic of power can defeat or completely change itself. Although the answer leaves no space for any doubt, the analysis of actual relationships between the forces of terrorist network and anti-terrorism coalition can serve as an additional argument.

5 POWER RELATIONSHIPS

The first comparison level includes the relation between the possibilities offered by hierarchy, on the one hand, and network, on the other. After that, we compare the risks for combat participants, the clarity of objectives and means at both sides, and finally the imperative of success.

¹¹ *The famous examples of enemies serving as a part of intelligence or political services include Osama bin Laden in CIA during the Soviet War in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein, who enjoyed the support of the USA during the Iran-Iraq War and propagated the western style (of dress among other things), but once his power grew he became a terrorist.*

Hierarchy-network

Ever since the concept of terrorist networks started being discussed (cf. Kastenmüller et al., 2011; Siqueira & Sandler, 2010), the weaknesses of rigid traditional hierarchal structures that prevail in the organization of political and military organization of anti-terrorism coalition have come to light. Network flexibility implies fine adjustment in unforeseeable and permanently changeable circumstances as well as the ability of fast coordination with the aim of innovation and continuity. A network is dynamic and strategically planned, it consists of self-programmed and self-directed units based on decentralization, participation and coordination, which all enables it to become the ground material out of which organizations are and will continue to be formed (Castells, 2000: 200). The inertia of hierarchical organization is conditioned by a number of factors. Primarily, the vertical flow of information causes the loss of clarity and the final sense of command at every lower operative level. This is contrary to the freedom of network from formal loyalty to superior structures, which produces greater clarity of the final vision, specific objectives and tasks, leading to the high motivation of participants. We can conclude that initial weaknesses of military action are visible already on this level of comparing organizational matrixes, especially when compared to very small groups or individuals who momentarily adapt to new circumstances exclusively led by the will to realize the ultimate objective.

Risk comparison

When the amount and dispersion of risk between terrorist and anti-terrorism structures is compared (cf. Caponecchia, 2012; White, Porter, & Mazerolle, 2012), a disproportion to the detriment of the latter can be noticed at first sight. The strategies are designed somewhere far high, in the protected centers of political and military power, without operative inclusion of any of the planners. The center has a minimum cost and a high motivation to realize the set objectives, because the objective realization multiplies their economic and political benefits. As we go down, i.e., toward direct operative executors of strategies on site, where even the smallest mistakes can be fatal or inexcusable, a disproportion between cost and motivation becomes increasingly visible. In other words, the potential cost is always at the maximum (one's own life), and the motivation to realize an objective, set somewhere far and high up, becomes minimal. To put it in simpler terms, direct participants have a minimum interest in the realization of strategic objectives, being permanently oriented to the preservation of bare lives. Contrary to them, is it necessary or possible to measure the ratio of risk and motivation of a suicide attacker? The motivation is, in this case, extremely high and hard to understand from the aspect of the preservation of one's life, and there is in this context no fear that the attacker will fail.¹²

12 *Sometimes terrorist group is not sure about the strong will of the suicide attacker and since they are afraid that he/she will change his/her mind in the last moment, they use remote triggers of explosive devices. However, the motivation is high in the great majority of cases, and it is the relevance of the general cause that imposes control mechanisms.*

Clarity of objectives and means

The next weakness of the current approach of war on terror is the wasting of time and energy on the harmonization of political goals and interests, as well as the permanent consideration of compromise and concession or often even abandoning basic intentions, all resulting from the attempts to achieve agreement of all interested actors, who are diverse like the special goals they aim for. Different military,¹³ political and economic interests together with the actors representing them gather on the same side or become distant depending on instant assessments, which significantly influences the speed and efficiency of actions on site. Behind the big words of friendship strengthening and loyalty to common values, extravagantly pronounced at national meetings, along the unquestionable interest of the media and the public, there is quiet unscrupulous political and economic diplomacy constantly led by nothing but interest. Professional soldiers must agree to utterly unprofessional demands arriving from politics, which leaves them with little chance to finally succeed when they face a highly motivated opponent with clear objectives and tasks needed to fulfill the mission on mind when at the battlefield.

Imperative of success

When we take into account the time of planning, harmonization of objectives, compromise, promises to military and political allies, and particularly debts to their “friends” from the centers of big business, the mistakes of anti-terrorism coalition are very costly, which means that the success, and precisely the success that would fulfill the expectations of all participants, is simply imperative. Numerous political destinies and economic rewards and possibilities depend on it, while the lives of thousands of victims are calculated a “statistically acceptable loss” or a “collateral damage”. Success can be expected for months and years, and it is hardly a tragedy if the set objective is realized only after a dozen of failures.

All these comparisons serve to supplement the so-far evident answer to the question about the success chances of the selected model of fighting terrorism. The current model cannot neutralize and overcome this global threat, but the creators of anti-terrorism strategies and all interested participants find it very hard and painful to accept this fact, especially because hundreds and even thousands of billions of dollars have been invested. The crucial question is thus whether the usual logic, traditionally relying on the trust in accumulated economic, political and military power, can defeat or completely change itself. This is the basic precondition for the breach in the continuity of causes leading to terrorism¹⁴ and for building real foundations for overcoming it.

¹³ *Military goals are usually just instrument of political goals set by economic interests – although military industrial complex may create economic (and consequently political) interests. Both possibilities are included here, with the perspective that the interest of military industry alone will not on its own lead to a war, although its role is significant.*

¹⁴ *It may seem that this “usual logic” has more influence on anti-terrorism strategies than the causes of terrorism, precisely because it has prepared the ground for the causes to flourish and then attempted to deal with the consequences in the same way.*

6 NEW POSSIBILITIES TO FIGHT TERRORISM

If the victory over terrorism was a genuine authentic objective honestly fought for by the global protagonists of economic, political and military power, the neutralization of other common global threats like organized crime (human trafficking, dealing weapons of mass destruction or narcotics, etc.) or systemic genocide would become an attainable objective. The basic precondition is thereby to abandon the *logic of power* that led to these problems, which means that the main actors would have to willingly renounce the wish and privilege to accumulate all forms of power in their hands. This expectation is unrealistic and extremely idealistic, but it needs to be expressed clearly to stress the conclusion that it is otherwise even more irrationally idealistic to expect any success in the fight against terrorism.

The next step on the way of removing the causes of terrorism is a sort of global redistribution which would include a systematic approach to correcting the wrongs accumulated throughout centuries. Only if serious intent and determination to deal with the consequences of injustice were shown can we expect a gradual diminishment of still unquestionable and undoubted arguments for ideological influence and massive recruitment in ever more firm and numerous terrorist networks. Not much wisdom is needed to realize that this also is an unrealistic idealistic expectation in present circumstances. Besides, political short-sightedness has for instance in Iraq led to damage that is hard and maybe even impossible to repair. Still, it is never late to start fighting for the victory of reason and the honest striving for peace, which would in any case mean more than the present reckless hurrying into a wider and even global conflict.

The third step toward final success includes patient long-term activity of intelligence agencies, which are now not footed in the previous two wider preconditions, thus bringing only illusory success and results. The exposure of one group or the prevention of one terrorist action does not make potential perpetrators lose the motivation to continue, but only makes them become more persistent and skillful in the preparation of new strikes. This activity would be meaningful if good will and wisdom were used to fulfill the first two preconditions on the global level. Then the conditions would be created for the gradual disappearance of currently present circumstances that conduce to quick enthusiasm and recruitment of new generations into soldiers and perpetrators of terrorist acts world-wide. This would hopefully put a stop to the growth and spread of the network and turn the course of events in favor of the anti-terrorism coalition.

The intelligence work would in that case be meaningful because it would enable a clear knowledge of the position and plans of the remaining terrorist groups. Thus the preconditions would be ensured for efficient actions of highly trained and specialized anti-terrorism groups with the task to neutralize the remaining parts of the network without massive military interventions and innocent victims.

7 CONCLUSION

The chances of taking steps that would lead to an integral change of approach are not likely when we take into consideration previous and current strategic decisions and actions in the fight against terrorism. The logic based on unlimited trust in economic, political and military power succeeded in subjugating a big number of countries and peoples, creating the preconditions for centuries-long exploitation of the colonies, retaining yearlong economic, political and cultural domination, and exhausting resources that led to a complete destruction of individual cultures and even civilizational circles. At the same time, the same logic managed to stabilize the injustice on the global level, legitimize violence and oppression in the name of democracy and development. All this watered the soil on which powerlessness and pain accumulated throughout generations came to be expressed in the worst possible way – the need to destroy everything that reminds of or has anything to do with the exploiting civilization.

Age-long neglect of the severity of the problem, the ideologization of political violence and the attempts to instrumentalize it for particular goals, the strategies that developed capitalism managed to apply with the majority of threats to it and have provided a greater momentum for capitalism by giving it the logistic support. The same political actors have for decades applied the same approach and taken the leading positions in the war on global terrorism. The adventure in Iraq, feared for the possession of weapons of mass destruction, which was a strategy for gaining public support of the invasion, while future direct participants in the war were simultaneously being convinced that there was no real military danger in Iraq, has exposed all weaknesses of the stubborn and long-developed logic of the military supremacy that would efficiently solve all political problems. An opponent ready to sacrifice his life in order to thereby cause the death of at least one enemy presents a challenge not easily responded to with any known military skill. The approach based in the application of force has for centuries brought the best results and fulfilled all set objectives, but is now exposing its weakness and inertia faced with the phenomenon that is hard to accept as a fact for all those believing in the absolute superiority of highly sophisticated military technology and economic and political resources at its disposal.

It takes not much wisdom to reach these conclusions. How come then that the best paid civil servants and top advisers of the creators of global strategies cannot reach them? We are here truly not far from the “extremely subversive” statements that anti-terrorism is only another ideology, which uses the terrorist threat as a great source of general concern and panic-stricken fear that capture general attention, and under the excuse of protecting global security legitimately cater for particular economic and political interests of the most powerful global actors.

REFERENCES

- Agnew, R. (1992). Foundation for a general strain theory. *Criminology*, 30(1), 47–87.
- Ali, M. V., & Gruenewald, J. (2006). *A comparative cross-national content analysis of terrorism news coverage*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Ameri-

- can Society of Criminology (ASC), Los Angeles Convention Center. Retrieved from http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p125867_index.html
- Baker-Beall, C. (2009). The discursive construction of EU counter-terrorism policy: Writing the 'migrant other', securitisation and control. *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 5(2), 188–206.
- Baker-Beall, C. (2014). The evolution of the European Union's 'fight against terrorism' discourse: Constructing the terrorist 'other'. *Cooperation & Conflict*, 49(2), 212–238.
- Boggs, C. (2011). *Empire versus democracy: The triumph of corporate and military power*. New York: Routledge.
- Braudel, F. (1973). *Capitalism and material life 1400–1800*. New York: Harpercollins.
- Burton, A. (1978). *Revolutionary violence: The theories*. New York: Crane, Russak.
- Caponecchia, C. (2012). Relative risk perception for terrorism: Implications for preparedness and risk communication. *Risk Analysis*, 32(9), 1524–1534.
- Castells, M. (2000). *Uspon umreženog društva* [The rise of the network society]. Zagreb: Golden marketing.
- Cloward, R., & Ohlin, L. (1960). *Delinquency and opportunity*. New York: Free Press.
- Cohen, R., & Mihalka, M. (2002). *Cooperative security: New horizons for international order* (The Marshall Center Papers, No. 3). Garmisch-Partenkirchen: George C. Marshall Center, European Center for Security Studies.
- Edkins, J. (2008). Biopolitics, communication and global governance. *Review of International Studies*, 34(S1), 211–232.
- Erez, E., Weimann, G., & Weisburd, A. (2011). *Jihad, crime, and the internet: Content analysis of Jihadist forum discussions*. Report submitted to The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), Washington, DC. Retrieved from <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/236867.pdf>
- Featherstone, R., & Deflem, M. (2003). Anomie and strain: Context and consequences of Merton's two theories. *Sociological Inquiry*, 73(4), 471–489.
- Foucault, M. (1994). *Nadzor i kazna: radanje zatvora* [Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison]. Zagreb: Informator.
- Furedi, F. (2005). *The politics of fear: Beyond left and right*. London: Bloomsbury Continuum.
- Gordon, N. (2014). Human rights as a security threat: Lawfare and the campaign against human rights NGOs. *Law & Society*, 48(2), 311–345.
- Habermas, J. (1988). *Filozofski diskurs moderne* [The philosophical discourse of modernity]. Zagreb: Globus.
- Habermas, J. (2002). *The theory of communicative action* (Reason and The Rationalization of Society, Vol. 1). Boston: Beacon Press.
- Hacker, F. (1996). *Crusaders, criminals, crazies: Terror and terrorists in our time*. New York: Norton.
- Herschinger, E. (2014). Political science, terrorism and gender. *Historical Social Research*, 39(3), 46–66.
- Hirschi, T. (1969). *Causes of delinquency*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kastenmüller, A., Greitemeyer, T., Aydin, N., Tattersall, A. J., Peus, C., Bussmann P., et al. (2011). Terrorism threat and networking: Evidence that terrorism salience decreases occupational networking. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 32(7), 961–977.

- Katunarić, V. (2000). *Castellova panorama nove društvene epohe* [Castells's panorama of the new social epoch, a foreword]. In M. Castells (Ed.), *Uspon umreženog društva* [The rise of the network society]. Zagreb: Golden marketing.
- Klein, J. (August 14, 2014). An evil that must be stopped. *Time*. Retrieved from <http://time.com/3110824/an-evil-that-must-be-stopped/#3110824/an-evil-that-must-be-stopped/>
- Lange, M., & Dawson, A. (2009). Dividing and ruling the world? A statistical test of the effects of colonialism and postcolonial civil violence. *Social Forces*, 88(2), 785–818.
- Marcuse, H. (1987). *Um i revolucija: Hegel i razvoj teorije društva* [Reason and revolution: Hegel and the rise of social theory]. Sarajevo: Svjetlost.
- Markides, K. C., & Cohn, S. F. (1982). External conflict/internal cohesion: A re-evaluation of an old theory. *American Sociological Review*, 47(1), 88–98.
- Merton, R. K. (1968). *Social theory and social structure*. New York: Free Press.
- Nyatepe-Coo, A. (2004). Economic implications of terrorism. In A. Nyatepe-Coo, & D. Zeisler-Vralsted (Eds.), *Understanding terrorism* (pp. 77–89). Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.
- Onwudiwe, I. (2001). *The globalization of terrorism*. Andershort: Ashgate.
- Pain, R. (2014). Everyday terrorism: Connecting domestic violence and global terrorism. *Progress in Human Geography*, 38(4), 531–550.
- Park, R. E. (1941). The social function of war: Observations and notes. *American Journal of Sociology*, 46(4), 551–570.
- Ranstorp, M. (1996). Terrorism in the name of religion. In R. Howard, & R. Sawyer (Eds.), *Terrorism and counterterrorism* (pp. 121–136). Guilford: McGraw-Hill.
- Rapoport, D. (1984). Fear and trembling: Terrorism in three religious traditions. *American Political Science Review*, 78(3), 668–672.
- Rapoport, D., & Alexander, Y. (Eds.). (1982). *The morality of terrorism: Religious and secular justifications*. New York: Pergamon Press.
- Reid, E., Qin, J., Zhou, Y., Lai, G., Sageman, M., Weimann, G., et al. (2005). Collecting and analyzing the presence of terrorists on the web: A case study of Jihad websites. In P. Kantor et al. (Eds.), *Intelligence and security informatics* (pp. 402–411). Berlin; Heidelberg: Springer. Retrieved from http://ai.arizona.edu/intranet/papers/ISI_ALLab_submission_final.pdf
- Richardson, L. (2006). *What terrorists want: Understanding the terrorist threat*. Manchester: John Murray.
- Ross, J. I. (1999). Beyond the conceptualization of terrorism: A psychological-structural model of the causes of this activity. In C. Summers, & E. Markusen (Eds.), *Collective violence: Harmful behavior in groups and government* (pp. 169–192). New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publ.
- Siqueira, K., & Sandler, T. (2010). Terrorist networks, support, and delegation. *Public Choice*, 142(1–2), 237–253.
- Stitt, B. G. (2003). The understanding of evil: A joint quest for criminology and theology. In R. Chairs, & B. Chilton (Eds.), *Star Trek visions of law & justice* (pp. 203–218). Dallas: Adios Press.
- Thalif, D. (2005). Politics: U.N. member states struggle to define terrorism. *Inter Press Service*. Retrieved from <http://www.ipsnews.net/2005/07/politics-un-member-states-struggle-to-define-terrorism/>

- Wallerstein, I. M. (1980). *The modern world system II: Mercantilism and the consolidation of the European world-economy, 1600–1750*. New York: Academic Press.
- Wallerstein, I. M. (1988). *The modern world system III: The second era of great expansion of the capitalist world-economy, 1730–1840s*. New York: Academic Press.
- Wallerstein, I. M. (2006). *European universalism: The rhetoric of power*. New York: The New Press.
- Weber, M. (1999). *Vlast i politika* [Government and politics]. Zagreb: Naklada Jeksenski i Turk, Hrvatsko sociološko društvo.
- White, G., Porter, M. D., & Mazerolle, L. (2012). Terrorism risk, resilience and volatility: A comparison of terrorism patterns in three Southeast Asian countries. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 29(2), 295–320.
- Worrell, M. P. (2011). *Why nations go to war: A sociology of military conflict*. New York: Routledge.

About the Authors:

Renato Matić, Ph.D., Associate Professor at the Department of Sociology, Studia Croatica, University of Zagreb. E-mail: rmatic@hrstud.hr; renatomic63@gmail.com

Anita Dremel, Ph.D., Centre for Croatian Studies, University of Zagreb; Department of Sociology (classical sociological theory) and Department of Educational Sciences and Teacher Education (methodology of teaching sociology). E-mail: adremel@hrstud.hr

Mateja Šakić, M.A., Research and Teaching Assistant at the Department of Sociology at the Croatian Catholic University. She is currently attending Ph.D. study in the field of Information and Communication Sciences at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at University of Zagreb. E-mail: mateja.sakic@gmail.com